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I. INTRODUCTION
England and several States that were once part of its empire (including the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have, in the twentieth cen-
tury, legislatively waived their common law immunity to certain civil actions
filed by citizens who are seeking to recover damages caused by the negligence of
the State and/or its servants.' This voluntary partial waiver of sovereign immu-
nity now subjects these States to potential liability in an effort to provide the
States' citizens with redress for previously unrecoverable damages. And while it
was the intent of legal reformers to cause these States to be treated in their own
courts in a manner that would be indistinguishable from the treatment accorded to
any other party submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts, nevertheless it is cru-
cial to note that certain public policy considerations continue to prevent the com-
plete abandonment of this doctrinal immunity.
Further, the ever-continuing judicial interpretation of the scope of the
waiver immunity in the respective courts in these countries virtually guarantees
that the delineation of the common law doctrinal defense will continue to evolve
in an effort to better reflect the contemporary social, political, and economic val-
ues peculiar to each dynamic society. This is because each of the aforementioned
countries is working toward an identical goal of securing for its citizens, by
means of the application and transformation of their respective common law in-
terpretations of the scope of the waiver, justice, which has been defined as being
"a matter of the right outcome of the political system: the right distribution of
goods, opportunities, and other resources." 2 Epitomizing the comparative inter-
pretation of the scope of the waiver, a "policy/operational dichotomy" has been
introduced in the respective bodies of common law interpreting the scope of the
waiver of immunity in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand as each of the forgoing has attempted to distinguish which tort liability
actions are justiciable pursuant to their respective waiver efforts and which are
not. It is important to observe that all of the aforementioned States have also
struggled with the same enigma that has plagued the application of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy since the United States Supreme Court first articulated
the delineation in Dalehite v. United States, i.e., the demarcation of where policy
or discretionary considerations (and immunity) end and where operational activi-
ties (and tort liability) begin.3
1 28 U.S.C. § 1346; Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, c. 44, § 2 (U.K.); Crown Liability Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-50 (1952)(Can.); Judiciary Act, 1903, § 64 (Austl.); Crown Proceedings Act ,1950,
§§ 3, 6 (N.Z.).
2 ROLAND DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 404-05 (1986).
3 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
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This article will analyze the common law origins of the defense of sovereign
immunity in the legal systems of England, the United States, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, and it will recognize and address the common, recurring
themes characterizing the waiver of immunity as evidenced in the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy. More importantly, it will demonstrate that the devel-
opment of this distinction is an example of the ever-continuing evolution of the
common law. Finally, a pragmatic mechanism aiding in the resolution of the
policy/operational dilemma in all five of the aforelisted jurisdictions will be sug-
gested and commented upon. The efficacy of this suggestion will justify the con-
clusion that a legal doctrine originating in a germinating body of common law
will uniformly evolve toward the conceptual goal of justice in derivative legal
systems regardless of its development in separate and distinct societies.4
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW
As the common law in England developed its own identity out of a meld of
Roman law and German customs, the resulting body of laws reflected social, po-
litical and economic factors that comprise English societal history. And as Eng-
land and the States sharing its common law heritage continued to develop and
evolve, their bodies of laws have continued to develop with them by perpetually
reflecting and incorporating the evolutions and influences inherent in the growth
of each nation. Because the laws of each respective State are continually devel-
oping and evolving in an attempt to reflect and define the contemporary values
and morals of their society in order to achieve a more perfect sense of justice as
viewed from within each State, Oliver Wendall Holmes expounded his very
Darwinian conclusion that in the landmark American jurisprudential writing, The
Common Law:
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consis-
tency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always
retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.5
Hence, as a society continues to evolve and develop, its common law will
4 This conclusion is based on the presumption that the States possessing these derivative legal
systems will continue to share roughly the same social, political, and economic values.
5 OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881). This statement is consistent with
Holmes' unreconstructed views on social Darwinism on economic issues, and, although he did not
read Darwin until almost 1900, the social theory that pervades his work is an obvious byproduct of
the enormous influence evolutionary theory had upon his thoughts ("evolution was in the air"). Id. at
vi; G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 360 (1993).
Holmes, however, was not the first to expound this view - Professor Julius Stone observed that juris-
prudential philosophers such as Maine in England, Savigny in Germany, and Montesquieu in France
had been considering the effect of social and political influences on the evolution of the law long be-
fore the concept was ever applied to biology or sociology. JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
LAW AND JUSTICE 36 (1966).
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also continue to evolve and develop to reflect this dynamism.6 "As institutions of
the state, courts make authoritative decisions about certain matters presented to
them. The social, political and economic environment influences, perhaps indi-
rectly, the nature of these matters."' Combining with these ancillary societal fac-
tors, the shaping influence of legal precedent, as defined by the doctrine of stare
decisis, in the common law throughout its history is unquestionable. However,
the authority and scope of common law precedent has varied greatly in the differ-
ent legal systems addressed,8 and the continuing evolutionary nature of the com-
mon law has been the subject of debate. As early as the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, legal scholars actively debated whether common law precedent
should continue to expand and evolve to encompass new fact and legal scenarios,
or whether the body of laws existing at that time should be viewed as a form of
optima regula, literally the "best rule" or the "highest rule," which, "after many
successions of ages . . . [had been] fined and refined" so as to form a complete
referential body of legal authority from which all subsequent legal decisions
might be conclusively decided.9
The first dramatic confrontation between these two philosophies took place
in the jurisprudential debate occurring in Calvin's Case, which determined the
validity of a claim of a Scottish born individual to be allowed to inherit real
property in England. "o The former position was advocated by individuals such as
Lord Ellesmere and Edwyn Sandys, who argued that, "new cases happen every
day: no lawe euer was, or euer can be made, that can prouide remedie for all the
future cases, or comprehend all circumstances of humane actions which judges
are to determine."" In rebuttal, lawyers including Sir Edward Coke and Francis
Bacon actively opposed the notion of any further evolution of the law, as Coke
claimed that there was no need for new laws, as "the laws of England are so
copius in this point" 2 that any legal questions might be decided based upon the
law expounded in the then-existing precedent. Further, Bacon suggested that, if
and when a matter of first impression arose, the courts should not "consult of a
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 360, 372 (1990), where Judge
Posner discusses the ever-continuing evolution of the common law in society as a function of the judi-
ciary promoting a "social policy of making markets work."
7 ROSs CRANSTON, LAW, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 45 (1987).
8 DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 24-25. The degree of application of legal precedent within any
given court varies according to the system's adherence to the strict doctrine of precedent or the re-
laxed doctrine of precedent. Whereas the strict doctrine generally requires courts to follow earlier
decisions of similarly situated courts or of courts of superior jurisdiction, the relaxed doctrine of
precedent, "on the other hand, demands only that a judge give some weight to past decisions on the
same issue, that he must follow these unless he thinks them sufficiently wrong to outweigh the initial
presumption in their favor." Id.
9 Keechang Kim, Calvin's Case (1608) and the Law of Alien Status, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 155,
161 (1996).
10 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (H.L. 1608).
11 The arguments of counsel are collected in 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 577
(W. Cobbett et al. eds., 1809). Hence arguments of counsel will be cited to this volume, and this par-
ticular quote is from Id. at 676.
12 Id. at 612.
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law to be made, but to declare the law already planted" 3 and thus should rely on
the already existing legal rules to make their determination. Coke supported this
when he espoused the position that the current law, "as optima regula - was
therefore given an unassailable and transcendental existence which is entirely re-
moved from the actual workings of the judiciary.""
Ellesmere and Sandys' argument that legal precedent must continue to de-
velop in order to deal with new and unforeseen legal questions contributed to
their victory in Calvin's Case.'5 However, the question next arises of why any
given law on any well-considered issue, the parameters of which have been re-
fined and resolved by courts over many years, must continue to evolve into new
and different forms? The answer again lies in the evolution of society. Holmes
noted that, "However much we may codify the law into a series of seemingly
self-sufficient propositions, those propositions will be but a phase in a continuous
growth."' 6 This is true because, as Holmes observed, the law is always ap-
proaching, but never reaching consistency. Because there will always be gaps in
the law, new situations, vagueness, and indeterminacy, the law will become en-
tirely consistent only when it becomes fixed and ceases to grow.
Accordingly, the interpretation of legal precedent must recognize that "law
and legal text are not disengaged from the circumstances of 'the time they were
made.'"7 In order to effectively correspond with and reflect the actual feelings
and demands of the community, the courts' present-day interpretation of histori-
cal precedent must recognize and address the dynamic that exists between the ra-
tionales supported, the historical adoption and growth of the law, and the con-
temporary values and goals sought by the society and governed by the legal
authority applying the precedent. If a contemporary legal authority fails in its
application of precedent to recognize any dissimilarities between the parameters
and goals of the justice, or public policy, sought in the current legal action and
the rationale behind the historical application of the law, the resultant precedent
runs the risk of diverging from the values and goals of justice sought by its soci-
ety. This, in turn, leads to a loss of credibility in the legal systems that govern
the society and risks creating "the greater evil of private retribution"' 8 by people
who, because the law has failed to provide them with a remedy for their injuries,
have been caused to abandon their belief in, and thus their abiding respect for,
the law.' 9
Developments in tort law responsive to socio-economic changes in society
are typified by the contemporary evolution of the defense of sovereign immunity,
13 Id. at 563.
14 Id. at 612; Kim, supra note 9, at 161.
15 Calvin's Case, supra note 10,at 410-11.
16 HOLMES, supra note 4, at 37.
17 Kim, supra note 9, at 162 (quoting Lord Ellesmere).
18 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 41-42.
19 CRANSTON, supra note 6, at 46. "Ostensibly, the operation of the courts is based on the as-
sumption that people know their rights and will take the initiative to enforce them if they expect to be
successful. "
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which reflects a refinement in the common law prompted by the transformation
of societal values with respect to the rights of the individual in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Hence the retrocession of the sovereign immunity defense is
similar to the developments that occurred in the field of workers' compensation
law during the same era:
In the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century, workers might fail
completely in a claim for damages for personal injuries, even if their employer
was clearly at fault, because of the wide defenses the judges evolved - volenti
(that employees had voluntarily assumed the risk), common employment (that the
injuries arose from the negligence of a fellow worker), and contributory negli-
gence. These defenses to a damages claim were given a wide scope 'in order to
ease the employer's financial burden.. . .' Later courts and parliaments gradu-
ally whittled them down in response to the growth of the political power of trade
unions. 20
Likewise, and for similar reasons, sovereign immunity has been whittled
away since the turn of the twentieth century as societies have increasingly recog-
nized the rights of individuals who have sustained injuries as the result of the
negligent acts of the state.
However, it is necessary to refer to the origins of the doctrine in order to
better understand the evolution of the scope of the sovereign immunity.2 Royal
courts in the middle ages first applied the doctrine, and their rationale in adopting
the feudal principle was that a lord could not be sued in his own court. 22 Black-
stone attributed the immunity to the royal prerogative as:
[Tihat special preeminence which the King hath over and above all other per-
sons, and out of the course of the common law, in the right of his royal dig-
nity... The law ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty. [He is] sover-
eign and independent [within his own dominions and] owes no kind of subjection
to any potentate on earth. Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought
against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction
over him, for all the jurisdiction implies superiority of power.23
Edwin Borchard, a professor of law at Yale University in the 1920s, ob-
served that the concept of sovereign immunity developed as a means of promot-
ing the conceptual inviolability of sovereign authority:
20 Id. at 136.
21 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 84 (1991). Interestingly, court opinions serve a diverse function in docu-
menting this historical approach because they espouse the laws and analyses of the era, and they also
serve as a "critical interpreter of and player in historical events, its precedents preserve, illuminate,
and provide a perspective on the nation's social, political, and legal traditions." Also, a court's deci-
sions are "often intertwined with historical events to such an extent that it is not possible to under-
stand those events without considering the precedents contributed to their development." Id.
22 PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 3-4 (2' ed. 1989).
23 Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924) (quoting I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 239, 241-2).
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Chitty adds that 'the inviolability of the King is essential to the existence of
his powers as supreme magistrate; and therefore his person is sacred. The law
supposes it impossible that the King himself can act unlawfully or improperly. It
cannot distrust him whom it has invested with the supreme power; and visits on
his advisors and ministers the punishment due to the illegal measures of the gov-
ernment. Hence the legal apothegm that the King can do no wrong.' Nothing
seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the
King's courts was purely personal.24
Accordingly, in response to claims for damages for the negligence of the
government, the courts denied relief and cited the maxim that "the King can do
no wrong" as grounds for declaring nonsuit. They held in this manner despite the
fact that the same courts had applied the aforementioned maxim since the Middle
Ages to produce virtually the contrary result. 2 In fact, this maxim was misun-
derstood even by Blackstone and Coke ,26 who either did not recognize its impli-
cation or instead consciously disregarded its original meaning, "that the King was
not privileged to do wrong."27 In medieval England, the King was not regarded
as being above the law; on the contrary, he was regarded as under a duty - an
unenforceable duty, to be sure - to give the same redress to a subject whom he
had wronged as his subjects were bound to give to each other. It was the notion
that the King was, by and large, subject to the same law as his subjects which
caused the petition of right, which made a legal claim against the King, to be
marked off from other petitions to the King by aggrieved subjects.28
The petition of right, a proceeding in Chancery by which a subject might
recover property in the possession of the king, could be utilized for the enforce-
ment of contractual rights.29  Equitable relief was also available against the
Crown pursuant to the filing of a petition, but its application did not extend to
torts."° Nevertheless, injured subjects were not necessarily without redress, be-
cause in many (but not all) cases, an action in tort could be brought against a
Crown servant in his individual capacity, and the Crown would usually defend
the action and pay the damages. 3
The petition of right also proved unsatisfactory as a procedural vehicle. Al-
though the procedure was simplified in England by the Petitions of Right Act of
1860, the petition was limited in that it was subject to the Crown's consent by
24 Id. (quoting CHITTY, THE LAW OF ROYAL PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 5 (1820)).
25 HOGG, supra note 22, at 6.
26 Kim, supra note 8, at 161. Interestingly, Coke was also of the opinion that the laws of Eng-
land had reached the stage of optima regula, as opposed to leges temporis, after having been refined
"in many successions of ages." Id. Thus, Coke's own revisionary interpretation of the maxim is
immediately and ironically undercut by the fact that his own interpretation of the meaning was a
variation from past interpretation and precedent.
27 Borchard, supra note 23, at 2, n. 2.
28 HOGG, supra note 22, at 4.
29 In Thomas v. The Queen, 10 Q.B. 31 (1874), it was held that the petition of right lay to re-
cover from the Crown unliquidated damages for breach of contract. See HOGG, supra note 22 at 6.
30 HOGG, supra note 22, at 6.
31 Id.
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endorsing the petition fiat justitiae - " let right be done. "32 "Of course, by 1860
responsible government was fully developed, so that the discretion to grant or
deny the royal fiat was in reality the discretion of the cabinet. In short, the gov-
ernment could only be sued if it consented to be sued. "3' By that time, however,
the public law of England had already migrated to its colonies, and the strained
law of Crown liability, along with the rest of the English common law legal sys-
tem, had been installed in the various colonies as part of the foundation of their
own embryonic legal systems. 4 Accordingly, England's colonial governments
adopted the petition of right as the procedure for suing the States in tort, and "af-
ter the advent of responsible government, each colonial government enjoyed the
privilege of granting or denying the royal fiat when faced with a lawsuit. Each
colonial government became immune from liability in tort. "35 Thus, while most
European states had long admitted liability in such cases by the nineteenth cen-
tury, 36 England and its colonial offspring continued to uphold and defend the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity within their respective legal systems to the detriment
of their own citizens' legal interests. Thus when Justice Miller of the United
States Supreme Court observed in Gibbons v. United States37 that "no govern-
ment has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches or unau-
thorized exercise of power by its officers or agents," he presumably was talking
about States deriving their common law legal systems from England.
Indeed, English constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey went so far as to suggest
32 Id. at 7.
33 Id.
34 While the English common law is the primary source for the majority of the United States'
initial body of common law precedent, the Supreme Court noted in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
294 n.36 (1947), that:
[I]t must not be overlooked that many [of the individual States] have been deeply influ-
enced by Roman and civil law to which their history exposed them. None of the terri-
tory west of the Alleghenies was more than briefly or casually subject to common law
before the Revolution. French civil law prevailed in most of the Ohio and Mississippi
Valleys from their settlement until Wolfe's decisive victory before Quebec in 1763. Its
ascendancy in the north then was broken, and in 1803 the Louisiana Purchase ended
French sovereignty in the rest of the Mississippi area. Louisiana continues, however,
a system of law based on the Code Napoleon. The Southwest and Florida once were
Spanish.
See also Colvin, Participation of the United States of America with the Republics of Latin America in
the Common Herotage of Roman and Civil Law, 10 Proceedings of the Eighth American Scientific
Congress 46.
[Further,] in New York there was a deep and persistent influence from Roman-Dutch
law. Upon capitulation of New Amsterdam, it was stipulated that certain Dutch law,
and judgments and customs should be respected. But even beyond this, in the organi-
zation of the courts the Dutch rule persisted although contrary to the 'Duke's Laws'
enacted by the conquer . . . . The Roman-Dutch element in New York law is recog-
nized by its courts.
E.g., Dunham v. Williams, 37 N.Y. 251, 253; Van Giessen v. Bridgford, 83 N.Y. 348, 356; Smith v.
Rentz, 131 N.Y. 169, 175, 30 N.E. 54, 56.
35 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7.
36 Borchard, supra note 21, at 2.
37 Gibbons v. United States 75 U.S. 269, 274 (1868)
INTRA-STATE TORT LIABILITY
that no preference or disparity of treatment really existed at the turn of the twen-
tieth century in England when he posited, "Why should the government be
treated differently in the matter of liability from any other legal person?" 3" Dicey
supported his position by noting that, in Britain, "every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibil-
ity for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen." However,
"Dicey disregarded the fact that in English law at that time the Crown, legally
the embodiment of the central government, enjoyed extensive immunities from
being sued in tort, even if officials did not."39
In response to the injustice caused by the application of the doctrine in the
twentieth century, Borchard noted that the "rule of law" extolled by Dicey was
flawed in that:
[Ilt requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-
American law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all risks of a defective,
negligent, perverse or erroneous administration of the State's functions, an un-
just burden which is becoming graver and more frequent as the government's ac-
tivities become more diversified and as we leave to administration officers in an
even greater degree the determination of the legal relations of the individual citi-
zen.
40
Accordingly, Borchard argued in favor of abolishing the affirmative defense
and summarized the sentiments of legal reformers when he declared, prior to the
United States' adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1944, that:
there is no reason why the most flagrant of injuries wrongfully sustained by the
citizen, those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed to rest, as they
now generally do, in practice if not in theory, at the door of the unfortunate citi-
zen alone. This hardship becomes the more incongruous when it is realized that
it is greatest in countries like Great Britain and the United States, where democ-
racy is assumed to have placed the individual on the highest plane of political
freedom and individual justice.41
Borchard opined that, "The reason for this long-continued and growing
injustice in Anglo-American law rests, of course, upon a medieval English theory
that 'the King can do no wrong,' which without sufficient understanding was in-
troduced into the common law of this country, and has survived mainly by reason
of its antiquity."42 Thus while the disparate treatment afforded to States based
38 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193 (10t'
ed. 1959)
39 UNITED KINGDOM NAT'L COMM. COMP. LAW, Governmental Liability: A Comparative
Study, 13 U.K. COMP. LAW SERIES 2 (John Bell & Anthony W. Bradley eds. 1991).
40 Borchard, supra note 23, at 1.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2. Holmes' jurisprudence supports this position when he also noted that:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.
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upon the anachronistic legal philosophy espoused by Justice Miller in Gibbons,
was potentially at odds with the society that it was purported to benefit, neverthe-
less the courts respecting and applying the common law doctrine continued to
uphold, sustain and expand it.
While judicial activists have sought to utilize the law as a means of social
control and as an instrument to effect social change,43 Holmes has concluded that,
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with
the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.""
Further, he observed that,
[I]n substance the growth of law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than
that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is leg-
islative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely men-
tion, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws
all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for
the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by liti-
gation is in fact and at the bottom the result of more or less definitely understood
views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and tradi-
tions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convic-
tions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
45
Thus, the common law is not only an instrument for effecting social change,
it is a mechanism through which the courts implicitly articulate, legitimize, and
codify the evolution of a society's social, political, and economic values.46
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought
of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and
then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters
on a new career.
HOLMES, supra note 5, at 5.
While he was not addressing the current state of the common law evolution of the doctrinal de-
fense of sovereign immunity when he penned this statement, nevertheless Holmes generally supports
Borchard's argument in favor of the abolition of the doctrine based upon his averment that the origi-
nal rationales supporting the doctrine had become obscure and inapplicable (also, Holmes drafted the
essays comprising THE COMMON LAw approximately fifty years prior to the printing of Borchard's
critical article, and thus could not possibly comment on same). Finally, he noted that, in the growth
of the common law:
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing
precedents. But just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier
creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the
use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. The re-
sult of following them must often be failure and confusion from the merely logical
point of view.
Id. at 35.
43 CRANSTON, supra note 7, at 32.
44 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 41.
45 Id. at 35-36.
46 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes' dissenting opinion went so
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In contrast to Holmes' socio-evolutionary theory of law, contemporary legal
philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin have argued that a society's law is com-
prised and defined by its rules, policies, and principles.47 These standards are
determined by the "popular morality" of a society, and they are shaped by the
"opinions about justice and other political and personal virtues that are held as
matters of personal conviction" by the majority of that society.4" Dworkin ex-
plains that the "moral traditions" of a society are comprised of its popular moral-
ity as viewed:
[O]ver some sizeable historic period including the present ... [and t]he distinc-
tion is then fairly straightforward between these ideas and the community's law.
Its law belongs to the community not just passively, because its members hold
certain views about what is right or wrong, but as a matter of active commit-
ment, because its officials have taken decisions that commit the community to
the rights and duties that make up the law.49
An empirical study of a society's moral traditions in addition to its contem-
porary rules will yield, according to Dworkin, the law of a society as defined by
its moral standards and legal commitments - the law as integrity.50
Dworkin's conception of law can be likened to, but yet it is still conceptu-
ally distinct from, the jurisprudential theories of legal positivism5 and natural
law.52 Determining and defining a society's law as integrity through a study of
its moral traditions and contemporary legal rules supposes that an informed em-
pirical study of a society's moral principles and contemporary legal rules will
yield a uniquely correct answer to the question of what the law is in a hard case.
Judges are to determine the one right answer in a hard case from both the histori-
far as to refer to judges as "interstitial" legislators. See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921).
47 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
48 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 97.
49 Id.
50 ld. at 95-96, 97.
51 Dworkin, supra note 47 describing the key tenets of "legal positivism" as:
The law of a community is a set of special rules used by the community directly or in-
directly for the purpose of determining which behavior will be punished or coerced by
the public power . . . .The set of these rules is exhaustive of "the law", so that if
someone's case is not clearly covered by a rule (because there is none that seems ap-
propriate, or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for some other reason) then the
case cannot be decided by applying "the law." It must be decided by some official,
like a judge, "exercising his discretion," which means reaching beyond the law for
some other sort of standard .... To say that someone has a "legal obligation" is to say
that his case falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or forbear from doing
something.
DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 33.
52 John FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 280 (1980). John Finnis has defined
.natural law" as "the set of principles of practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human
community." H.L.A. Hart noted that the classical theory of natural law is "that there are certain
principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must
conform if it is to be valid." HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 186 (2" ed. 1997),
2000
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
cal and contemporary application of legal rules in a society and from their deriva-
tion from the values characterizing that society. Further, Dworkin's definition of
law suggests that an empirical review of a State's moral history as well as its
contemporary common law will yield a determinate concept of law for that soci-
ety. The law revealed in such an empirical review would represent the pure law
53
relative to such a society, and this concept is similar to (but also distinguishable
from) natural law theory because "the set of principles of practical reasonable-
ness in ordering human life and human community" in Dworkin's theory would
recognize particularly societal (as opposed to universal) values.
Thus, Dworkin is bent on defining a society's law as a series of standards
deriving their legitimacy from certain moral and philosophical judgments that
have occurred and developed in the history of the society through and including
the present time. He is not unlike Holmes in that he recognizes the effect of so-
cietal influences on law. But he is unlike Holmes in that Dworkin defines the
law in retrospect based upon the history of society while Holmes postulated that a
society's law is more contemporaneously redefined as its courts' rulings react to
and reflect the dynamic political, social and economic influences on society. The
rise and fall of governments, as well as a society's interactions with neighboring
States, affect and shape a State's historical development, and fortune, coinci-
dence, and other innumerable external and internal influences are decisive shap-
ing factors in its historical development. In response to these unforeseeable and
chaotic developments, a society and its law react by changing and evolving in
unpredictable ways to develop and cope with new conditions and challenges. As
Holmes observed, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. "54
Holmes' definition of the law is predicated upon his judicial experience in
applying laws during the chaotic evolution of society. Dworkin recognizes that a
rival to his theory of law as integrity, and to legal positivism, is "legal realism,"
a semantic theory that the law, as defined by lawyers, is a prediction of what any
particular judge will do in a case." Holmes very much epitomizes this theory of
predictability when he specifies that, "The prophesies of what the courts will
do... are what I mean by the law."56 He is, at best, agnostic about whether any
enduring standards might exist, and, even if they do, whether they have any rele-
vance to the law. While cynical in outlook, attorneys who have plead cases be-
fore a litany of judges will attest that Holmes' candid description of the law is not
53 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 407. "Present law gropes toward pure law when modes of deci-
sion appear that seem to satisfy fairness and process and bring law closer to its own ambition." He
also notes that, "Sentimental lawyers cherish an old trope: they say that law works itself pure. The
figure imagines two forms or stages of the same system of law, the nobler form latent in the less no-
ble, the impure, present law gradually transforming itself into its own purer ambition, haltingly to be
sure, with slides as well as gains, never worked finally pure, but better in each generation than the
last. There is matter in this mysterious image, and its adds to both the complexity and the power of
the law as integrity." Id. at 400.
54 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 1.
55 DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 36.
56 Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
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necessarily apocryphal and that, while Dworkin's theory of adjudication tells
judges how they should decide cases, the outcome of any particular litigation of-
ten very much depends to a degree upon the subjective discretionary judgment of
the judge who is entrusted on meting out justice. Thus for Holmes, if a society's
laws are going to accurately correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong, those laws have to contemporaneously
evolve as society's dynamic social, political, and economic values change
(whether for good or not). This is not true for Dworkin: the significant role he
assigns to morality in his jurisprudence limits the extent to which transformations
in the law could legitimately be induced by current social mores alone.
An example of the law evolving to reflect the changing values of society as
theorized by Holmes is found in the English House of Lords' treatment of the
common law duty of an occupier of land toward trespassers. In 1929 the House
of Lords set forth the rule, in Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dunbeck, that an
occupier owed no duty of care to a trespasser on his land, but was only liable for
causing him harm recklessly or deliberately.5 7 In 1972 the House of Lords revis-
ited the issue in Herrington v. British Railways Board and, in developing a new
rule, the court had to establish a proper balance between property rights of the
occupier and the need to protect people against injury.58 Because the trespasser
was an unwanted and uninvited intruder on the land who forced a relationship
upon the occupier, it was considered unfair to impose on the latter the same duty
as he owed to the people he permitted to come on to his land. The only duty
owed was to act as a 'humane man' would do, given his knowledge of the likeli-
hood of trespassers and of any danger there might be on the premises.59
Lord Pearson observed in Herrington, inter alia, that a change in the law
was necessitated by "changed social conditions with more people living in towns
and a lack of open spaces, so that trespassing, especially by children, was more
likely than before."60 A number of other Lordships "stressed that a new rule was
necessary to accommodate changed social attitudes about the duties property
owners owed to trespassers. "61 It is argued that the decision of the House of
Lords in Herrington reflects an even more dramatic evolution in the social
awareness of English law. Herrington evidences the House of Lords', and thus
the law's, recognition of English society's continuing reevaluation of the relative
importance of an occupier's rights and dities relating to real property versus the
intrinsic value of human life. The original non-liability to trespassers rule drew
much of its strength from the unfairness of making landowners owe duties (such
as warning, fencing, guarding, etc.) to uninvited and unwelcome trespassers.
However, the House of Lords' reconsideration of the fairness of imposing such
duties in light of the injuries sustained as the direct result of such a policy evi-
dences the law's continuing reevaluation of individuals' rights versus the protec-
57 Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dunbeck, 1929 App. Cas. 358.
58 Herrington v. British Railways Board, 1972 App. Cas. 877.
59 JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 62 (1983).
60 Id. at 61.
61 Id.
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tion of the general welfare as it is currently conceived and valued. Accordingly,
the evolution of the English law concerning the duty of care an occupier owes to
a trespasser is not based upon any optima regula, but rather it is predicated upon
the ever-evolving social, political, and economic conditions that define any par-
ticular era.
Holmes observed that, "The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing
lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done,
and those in which he is not."'6 Those "dividing lines" were based upon policy
reasons and, according to Holmes, what is generally expedient for the community
taken as a whole. So what are the social, political, and economic policy argu-
ments that have been, and still are, accepted by the legal systems in England and
its jurisprudential legatees in their continuing partial common law sustention of
the doctrinal immunity? Further, what arguments have been offered in rebuttal
by legal reformers in the twentieth century as they have sought to mollify the
disparate treatment inflicted upon the populace by the doctrine? Finally, which
universal legal, sociological, and political factors have caused the five nations
under consideration to reach similar conclusions regarding the continued applica-
tion of the doctrine?
Public authorities proffer many public policy6 3 arguments in favor of the
preservation of the doctrine. One such argument is the protection of the public
treasury,6 a rationale that is predicated upon the philosophy that the government
exists for the benefit of the community and cannot lose all of its wealth or the
general public will suffer.' The origins of this argument can be traced back to
the time of the initial fragmentation of England's colonial empire.' And, it has
been proffered in the United States by no lesser authority than the Supreme
Court, which, in the same vein of utilitarianism, noted in Robertson v. Si-
chel,"[The Government] does not guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of
its officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its op-
erations, in endless embarrassments and difficulties, which would be subversive
of the public interests.'67 It is still proffered in the United States as an argument
against increasing the scope of any waiver of immunity in order to prevent dam-
age to the public interests. This theory is evident in the State of Utah's Report of
the Governmental Immunity Committee iii, wherein the committee noted that,
"Supporters of the doctrine believe it is a necessary one to prevent diversion of
62 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 79.
63 CRANSTON, supra note 7, at ix. "Public policy is an ill-defined term. As used in legal dis-
course, it indicates the non-doctrinal factors which may be used in some judicial decision making...
it connotes the 'product' of state decision and action, in other words the decisions and actions of gov-
ernment departments and agencies, courts, and other bodies able to allocate values authoritatively in
society."
64 JAMES HUFFMAN, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY AND DISASTER MITIGATION 451 (1986).
65 BELL, supra note 59, at 2.
66 Russel v. Devon County, 2 T.R. 667 (H.L. 1788)(wherein the Court noted, in an act of clas-
sical utilitarianism, that, "it is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to be inconven-
ienced").
67 Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515, 8 S.Ct. 1286 (1886).
VOL. 29:1
INTRA-STATE TORT LIAImry
funds from needed public expenditures to the compensation of individuals. "I
Additional arguments proffered in support of maintaining the scope of im-
munity include: the avoidance of disruption in public services and risk to public
safety;69 the potential negative or defensive effect on legislative and/or adminis-
trative policy decisions based upon the threat of potential tort liability;7' the
avoidance of public embarrassment, negative publicity, and other public rela-
tions-related difficulties resulting from any adverse legal actions;' and the eco-
nomic distinction deriving from the recognition that government, unlike private
enterprise, exists only to serve the public and not to derive a profit. 72 This last
argument suggests that sovereign States should not be subject to the same eco-
nomic costs and penalties 73 that might be inflicted upon other, profit-oriented
market operators.
Legal authorities arguing for reducing the scope of government immunity
have responded to the referenced arguments by proffering alternative arguments
seeking to eviscerate the rationales proffered in support of the doctrine. In rebut-
tal to the previously discussed economic identity argument, legal scholars have
responded that since the public purpose undertaken by the State involves an in-
jury-producing activity, any resulting injuries or damages should be viewed as
part of the overall economic cost of the public enterprise, and not simply as an
additional, ancillary cost. 74 Additionally, it has been argued that it is far better to
distribute the cost of government-caused injuries among the beneficiaries of the
government actions than to impose them in their entirety on innocent victims.
Further, while the government does not profit from its activities, the taxpayers do
and thus they should have to bear the cost of government liability.75 Finally, it
has been argued that ordinary private tort suits that might be brought against the
government generally do not involve any attempt to control government activity76
and should instead serve as an impetus for the government, acting in a manner
similar to comparably situated private actors, to act in a reasonable manner so as
to avoid injury to innocent third parties.'
Accordingly, if Holmes was correct when he posited:
every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at the
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy;
most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious re-
sult of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less
68 State of Utah's Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee iii.
69 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
70 BELL, supra note 59, at 2.
71 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
72 Id.
73 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THlE LAW (2n' ed. 1977).
74 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 451, 514-15 (wherein Learned Hand's theory of tort liability is discussed in terms of
economic reasonableness and efficiency).
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traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis, 78
then it would follow that the public policy arguments set forth above and
proffered in support of, and in opposition to, the ever-continuing efforts to de-
lineate scope of sovereign immunity as a bar to individual recovery in contempo-
rary society must reflect the unsettled and diverse social, political, and economic
values of the society espousing those opinions. And if Dworkin's definition of
justice within a society ("a matter of the right outcome of the political system:
the right distribution of goods, opportunities, and other resources") is correct,
then the difficulties encountered by courts as they attempt to delineate, by means
of the common law, the contemporary scope of sovereign immunity so as to
promote justice by making the law reflect the values of society, the incongruities
in the common law must reflect the society's continuing struggle to achieve a
consensus of social, political, and economic values.
The Historical Development and Current Delineation of the Pol-
icy/Operational Dichotomy in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand
A. The United States
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), authorizes suits against
the United States for damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred." The Act also sets forth that the United States shall be liable with respect
to tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. ""
The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act is set forth in great
detail in the majority opinion authored by Justice Reed in Dalehite v. United
States.8° Briefly summarized, the opinion observes that the Seventy-Ninth Con-
gress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 after nearly thirty years of
Congressional consideration. Justice Reed noted that the Act was intended to
provide an efficient means for individuals to obtain redress for the torts of its
agents, and "It was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume
the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out
its work. ""' He further noted, in a footnote to the opinion, that:
Certain tentative experiments in this direction should be noted. In 1855, Con-
gress established the Court of Claims and consented to suit therein on claims
78 HOLMES, supra note 56.
79 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).
80 Dalehite, supra note3.
81 Id. at 24.
VOL. 29:1
INTRA-STATE TORT LIABILITY
based on contract or federal law or regulation. This consent was enlarged in
1887 to include all cases for damages not sounding in tort. At the same time
United States District Courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of claims up to
$10,000. In 1910, Congress consented to suits in the Court of Claims for patent
infringement. When the Government took over the operation of the railroads
during the First World War, Congress made the United States subject to the
same responsibility for property damage, personal injury, and death as the pri-
vate owners would have been. In 1920 and 1925, the Government consented to
suits in the district courts upon admiralty and maritime torts involving govern-
ment vessels, without limitation as to amount.
From the Committee hearings we learn that the previous 85 years had witnessed
a steady encroachment upon the originally unbroken domain of sovereign immu-
nity from legal process for the delicts of its agents. Yet a large and highly im-
portant area remained in which no satisfactory remedy had been provided for the
wrongs of government officers or employees, the ordinary "common law" type
of tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the negligent op-
eration of an automobile. 2
However, it was not Congress' intention to waive the sovereign immunity of
the United States in all respects. The United States can be sued only to the extent
that it has waived its sovereign immunity,83 and the party asserting a cause of ac-
tion against the government has the burden of proving an unequivocal waiver of
immunity." Congress intentionally and specifically excepted several classes of
tort claims from being actionable under the Act, including, inter alia, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a), which specifies that the Act shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused.'
Perhaps Judge Edward R. Becker of the United States District Court, East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, most articulately explained the rationale underlying
this exception in his opinion in Blessing v. United States." According to Judge
Becker, § 2680(a) prevents: tort actions from becoming a vehicle for judicial in-
82 Id. at 25, n. 10. It is interesting to contrast the very different tone of this statement with that
evidenced by Justice Miller almost a century earlier in Gibbons v. United States. Gibbons, supra
note 7. This radical reevaluation of policy reflects the changes that occurred in the United States be-
tween the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the law's emphasis shifted from ideal rule utilitarian-
ism to individual rights and liberties.
83 United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
84 Baker v. United States, 817 F. 2d 560, 562 (91' Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204
(1988).
85 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
86 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
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terference with decision making that is properly exercised by other branches of
the government and of protecting "the government from liability that would seri-
ously handicap efficient government operations" (Citations omitted). Statutes,
regulations, and discretionary functions, the subject matter of § 2680(a), are, as a
rule, manifestations of policy judgments made by the political branches. In our
tripartite governmental structure, the courts generally have no substantive part to
play in such decisions. Rather, the judiciary confines itself-or, under laws such
as the FTCA's discretionary function exception, is confined-to adjudication of
facts based on discernible objective standards of law. In the context of tort ac-
tions, with which we are here concerned, these objective standards are notably
lacking when the question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but
political practicability, not reasonableness but economic expediency. Tort law
simply furnishes an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political
or economic decisions.
In creating the discretionary function exception, Congress expressed its in-
tention that activities undertaken by agents of the United States that resulted in
injury to the populace would not be actionable under the Act if they occurred in
the direct implementation of a statutory or regulatory policy. The existence of a
duty of care that might be owed by the government authority is not even ad-
dressed, because the issue becomes moot if immunity for the conduct in question
has not been specifically waived. Thus when the statute dictates that claims
predicated upon, "an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation ... or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty," the result is that these types of activities simply become non-
justiciable because they are still barred by sovereign immunity. Thus, garden-
variety negligence actions such as those deriving from the careless operation of
an automobile are actionable, but claims for damages attributable to the opera-
tional application of discretionary policy decisions regulating or governing the
type or maintenance schedule of the government automobile in question afford no
such recourse.87
Justice Reed discussed the nature and scope of the exceptions delineated in §
2680(a) in extensive detail in Dalehite, which involved multiple large claims for
damages against the United States arising out of an explosion of ammonium ni-
87 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 n. 7 (1991), the Supreme Court explained the
rationale for this distinction:
There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government agent that are
within the scope of his employment but not within the discretionary function exception
because these acts cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory re-
gime seeks to accomplish. If one of the officials involved in this case drove an auto-
mobile on a mission connected with his official duties and negligently collided with an-
other car, the exception would not apply. Although driving requires the constant
exercise of discretion, the official's decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be
said to be grounded in regulatory policy.
Id. at 325 n.7.
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trate fertilizer which had been produced and distributed under the direction of the
United States for export to devastated areas occupied by the Allied Armed Forces
after World War II. The majority opinion concluded that the allegedly negligent
acts of the government in loading and storing the fertilizer were governmental
duties protected by the discretionary function exception and held the action was
barred by § 2680(a). Describing the discretion protected by § 2680(a) as "the
discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judg-
ment of the best course,""8 the Court also noted that:
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends.
It is enough to hold, as we do, that the 'discretionary function or duty' that can-
not form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initia-
tion of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by execu-
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of
operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is dis-
cretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the opera-
tions of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.89
Thus the majority determined that all of the alleged tortious conduct attrib-
uted to the Government by the plaintiffs fell within the discretionary penumbra of
the exception, as opposed to determining that at some point during the implemen-
tation of the policies in question the activities became operational in scope. This
decision recognized that policy considerations implemented in the form of discre-
tionary activities could extend throughout the operational implementation of a
government function, and the policy/operational dichotomy was thus predicated
upon the way that a particular activity was interpreted by the courts. The distinc-
tion thus appears to be based almost entirely on semantic arguments based upon
subjective interpretations of the law in light of Congress' articulated intent in
passing the Act. This semantic nature of the distinction is observed in Dalehite
when the reader notes that the dissenting justices' opinion disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion after applying the distinction, and the dissent supported its
contrary determination with the same facts."° The problem was, and continues to
be, that the policy/operational dichotomy suggests no clear delineation between
the two positions so as to provide guidance for jurists making this problematic
determination.
The Supreme Court readdressed the policy/operational dichotomy 9' in its
opinion in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Vicao Aerea Grandense (Varig Air-
lines). The Varig Court noted that:
As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define with preci-
88 Dalehite, supra note 3, at 34.
89 Id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted).
90 Id. at 57-58.
91 See also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122 (1955), Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). The
Supreme Court has also addressed the dichotomy in its opinions in these cases/
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sion every contour of the discretionary function exception. From the legislative
and judicial materials, however, it is possible to isolate several factors useful in
determining when the acts of a Government employee are protected from liabil-
ity by § 2680(a). First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of
the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a
given case. As the Court pointed out in Dalehite, the exception covers '[niot
only agencies of government . . . but all employees exercising discretion.' 92
Thus, the basic inquiry concerning the application of the discretionary func-
tion exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employee-
whatever his or her rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to
shield from tort liability. 93
The Varig Court did not present a bright line test that would determine what
behaviors constituted policy or operational conduct, and it instead simply deline-
ated who might be an agent of the government when the determination is being
considered. Further, since the rank of the government agent is not relevant to
the determination of whether the activity in question might be discretionary in
nature, the discretionary function exception arguably extends through every as-
pect of the operational implementation of a policy.
In Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that the discre-
tionary exception only covers acts that "involv[e] an element of judgment or
choice," and so, when properly construed, it "protects only government actions
and decisions based upon considerations of public policy. "9 Three years later,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Gaubert mandated that:
Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation mandates particu-
lar conduct, and the employee obeys the direction, the Government will be pro-
tected because the action will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led
to the promulgation of the regulation. If the employee violates the mandatory
regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for
choice and the action will be contrary to policy. On the other hand, if a regula-
tion allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a
strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves
consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regula-
tions. 9
Accordingly, the Gaubert Court expanded its holding in Varig, and held that
a discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in
that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions.'
Day-to-day management of banking affairs, like the management of other busi-
nesses, regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses
92 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Vicao Aerea Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
104 S. Ct. 2755, 81 L. Ed. 660 (1984).
93 Id.
94 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 81 L. Ed.2d 531 (1988).
95 Gaubert, supra note 87.
96 Id. at 325
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is the wisest.' Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning
level. "[Ilt is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that
governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case."98
It is also important to note that the Vaig Court further observed that an un-
derlying basis for the inclusion of the discretionary functions exception in the Act
was that:
Congress wished to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort. By fashioning an exception for discre-
tionary governmental functions, including regulatory activities, Congress took
"steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap ef-
ficient government operations. ""
By noting that it was Congress' legislative intent to prevent the courts from
usurping the legislative and executive roles of promoting social, economic, and
political policy, the Supreme Court declared its recognition that the exemption
was a legitimate means for retaining and applying the affirmative defense of sov-
ereign immunity in certain situations. However, implicit in this statement is the
notion that, in their judicial decisions, the courts shall interpret and apply this ex-
ception in a spirit the courts determine to be consistent with the intent of Con-
gress in creating the exception. Thus attributing the interpretation to enabling
and protecting the social, economic, and political policy intentions of the drafters
of the Act may now legitimize any contemporary common law elucidation of ex-
emption provided by § 2680(a). Accordingly, because the language of the Act
and the circumstances of any subsequent case applying same are viewed in light
of the then-existing social, political, and economic values held by the court con-
sidering the case, the contemporary interpretation of the scope of the exemption
provided by the Act (and thus the scope of the defense of sovereign immunity)
allows for, and legitimizes, the ever-continuing evolution of the common law de-
lineation of the scope of the waiver.
B. England
In England, the petition of right remained the sole mechanism available to
individuals for suing the Crown in tort until 1947. The Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947 abolished the petition of right, including the requirement of the fiat, and
allowed individual citizens to sue the Crown in the same fashion as they might
another private party."o Further, although modified forms of redress were avail-
able against the Crown's agent in tort, the Crown Proceedings Act was the first
legal authority to impose general tortious liability upon the Crown "in respect of
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Varig).
99 S.A. Empresa, supra note 92, at 814.
100 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7.
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torts committed by its servants or agents." 101
Section 2 of the Crown Proceedings Act defines the scope of the waiver of
immunity, and, in pertinent part, it declares that:
[T]he Crown shall be subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a
private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject:
- in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents;
- in respect of any breach of those duties which a person owes to his ser-
vants at common law by reason of being their employer; and
- in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to the
ownership, occupation, possession or control of property. 02
However, unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act, no statutory provision is
made in the Crown Proceeding Act providing for the exclusion of discretionary
functions or duties on the part of a government authority from the waiver of im-
munity. Instead, this policy-oriented case law limitation on the waiver has been
shaped by the courts, which consider whether the injuries sustained were foresee-
able, whether the parties were sufficiently proximate, and, if so, whether it is
fair, just and reasonable to impose upon the public authority a duty of care in the
discharge of its responsibilities to the individuals claiming that they are entitled to
damages from the authority as the result of its activities. 3
In an effort to delineate which torts attributable to the government may be
actionable, the policy/operational dichotomy emigrated from the United States to
the English legal system.'t ', The policy issue was originally recognized in the
House of Lords' opinion in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, in
which Lord Romer summarized the issue of whether a government authority had
acted reasonably was "a question involving the consideration of matters of policy
and sometimes the striking of a just balance between the rival claims of economy
and thrift."" ° The House of Lords first addressed the dichotomy, although not
explicitly, in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office, when Lord Diplock recog-
nized that Parliament had entrusted a discretionary duty to a public authority in
charge of running a juvenile detention facility as to how to best achieve the pub-
lic purposes assigned to that authority.0 6 Lord Diplock opined that a court
should not substitute its own view of the appropriate means for the department
through the granting of an action for negligence. 7 "To ask whether the defen-
dant had been negligent in adopting [the policies governing the structure of the
101 Id. at 82-83.
102. Crown Liability Act, supra note 1.
103 Caparo Indus. Plc. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 App. Cas. 605, 618 (appeal taken from Eng.);
PAUL P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 864-67 (4'b ed. 1999).
104 CRAIG, supra note 103, at 123.
105 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, App. Cas. 74, 86 (1941)(appeal taken from
England).
106 Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office, 1970 App. Cas. 1004 (1970).
107 Id. at 1067-68.
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program] would be to ask the court to balance the competing interests [of soci-
ety], a task which, as Lord Diplock stated, the court is not competent to per-
form. "108
The House of Lords first explicitly explored the dichotomy in its decision in
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council."° In Anns, the defendant municipal
council was sued by real property owners who alleged that the council had
breached a claimed duty imposed by a building statute by either not inspecting
the foundations of their edifice during its construction or by inspecting it in a
negligent manner. This purported breach of duty allowed the building to be con-
structed upon an inadequate foundational base, and it was averred by the plain-
tiffs that they suffered damages as a result of the council's negligence.
In his opinion in Anns, Lord Wilberforce noted that the duty of care owed
by a public authority to an individual, "may be limited by considerations of pol-
icy. Where the defendant is the Crown, or any other public authority, an impor-
tant consideration of policy is the concern of courts not to disturb decisions made
by public officials who are ultimately accountable to the electorate."'"i Lord
Wilberforce then directly addressed, for the first time in English law, the distinc-
tion between planning and operational decisions. He substituted the term "pol-
icy" for "planning" in his determination of the issue, and he observed that "many
'operational' powers or duties have in them some element of 'discretion'. It can
safely be said that the more 'operational' a power or duty may be, the easier it is
to superimpose a common law duty of care.""' Thus, a public authority's activi-
ties deriving from policy decisions concerning the allocation and distribution of
scarce resources and assets would not be reviewable by the courts, but a review-
able duty of care might be determined to exist when the cause of action arose out
of the alleged careless or negligent operational implementation of those policies.
This position was summarized in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,"2
where Lord Browne-Wilkinson formulated a three-stage test to accommodate the
application of the policy/operational distinction:
[First] Where Parliament has conferred a statutory discretion on a public au-
thority, it is for that authority, not for the courts, to exercise the discretion: noth-
ing which the authority does within the ambit of the discretion can be actionable
at common law. [Second] If the decision complained of falls outside the statutory
discretion, it can (but not necessarily will) give rise to common law liability.
However, if the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion include matters
of policy, the court cannot adjudicate on such policy matters and therefore cannot
reach the conclusion that the decision was outside the ambit of the statutory dis-
cretion. Therefore a common law duty of care in relation to the taking of deci-
sions involving policy matters cannot exist ....
108 Paul P. Craig, Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power, 94 L. Q. Rev. 428, 437
(1978).
109 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, App. Cas. 728 (1978).
110 HOGG, supra note 22, at 122.
111 Anns, supra note 109, at 754.
112 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, 2 App. Cas. 633 (1995).
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[Third] If the plaintiff's complaint alleges carelessness, not in the taking of a
discretionary decision to do some act, but in the practical manner in which that
act has been performed . . . the question whether or not there is a common law
duty of care falls to be decided by applying the usual principles ...."
Accordingly, an action against a public authority could only succeed if the
activities made the basis of a plaintiffs claims occurred outside the authority's
discretionary authority, and in making this determination "the court could not as-
sess factors which were felt to be non-justiciable, or within the policy category of
the policy/operational dichotomy.". 4 Thus, in the event that a trial court deter-
mines that a public authority owes a common law duty of care to a plaintiff, that
plaintiff must then prove that the authority's conduct was justiciable because it
was acting outside its statutory discretion.
While England's government authority tort liability scenario became quite
similar to that of the United States with respect to its adoption of the pol-
icy/operational distinction, the basis underlying the application of the dichotomy
in English law is a judicially created discretionary function exception. Further, if
a plaintiff demonstrates that an authority acted outside its discretion, the court
must determine whether a duty of care might actually be owed to the plaintiff.
Alternatively, the United States' statutory discretionary function exception makes
no effort to articulate this legal basis for non-suit, as the duty of care question is
a moot issue due to the fact that the government's sovereign immunity in this
realm has never been waived. Hence the dichotomy in these countries evolved in
separate but comparatively similar manners that reflect the distinctions typical of
the jurisprudence of their particular states.
However, England's public liability case law has recently encountered an
impediment to its natural evolutionary growth. The Human Rights Act, 1998
(HRA), incorporated the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into
English domestic law. Section 6 of the HRA requires that the courts interpret
legislation in accordance with the ECHR. Section 2 of the HRA provides that
the national courts, in making their determinations of law, must consider the de-
cisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), although the ECtHR's
decisions are not binding as precedent. Accordingly, the common law of Eng-
land must now be viewed in light of Article 6 of the ECHR, and acts of public
authorities that are incompatible with those rights are unlawful. 5
In 1998 the ECtHR determined in its decision in Osman v. United Kingdom,
that the decision in the underlying suit was contrary to the provisions of Article 6
of the ECHR.1 6 In the underlying suit, a domestic court determined at the outset
of litigation that the public authority in question owed no duty of care to a plain-
tiff, and thus the plaintiffs case was struck for failing to state a viable claim.
113 Id. at 738-739.
114 Paul P. Craig & Duncan Fairgrieve, Barrett, Negligence and Discretionary Powers, 1999
Pub. L. 627, 631.
115 CRAIG, supra note 103, at 445.
116 Osman v. United Kingdom, 5 B.H.R.C. 293 (1998).
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The House of Lords affirmed the lower court, and the ECtHR essentially deter-
mined that the plaintiff's human rights were violated by the English legal system
when it denied him a hearing on the merits of his claim. The decision of the
ECtHR did not, however, directly address the issue concerning the fact that the
claim was struck because there was no viable cause of action asserted under Eng-
lish substantive law. Regardless, the ECtHR resolved that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to argue his case so that his allegations of tortious conduct might be investi-
gated.
Accordingly, when the House of Lords was confronted with another gov-
ernment liability case where the plaintiff's claim had been struck"' at the outset
of litigation at the county court level based on the lack of existence of a duty of
care in Barrett v. Enfield LBC", Lord Browne-Wilkinson found the Osman
precedent difficult to apply. Theoretically, the House of Lords could have opted
to disregard the Osman precedent and might have ruled according to established
English law," 9 but the plaintiff would have almost certainly taken his case to the
ECtHR in an effort to enforce the Osman reasoning in Barrett. So, in an effort
to comply with the spirit of the ECtHR's decision in Osman, the House of Lords
accepted the appeal. The case was sent back to the county court to make a rea-
soned decision of whether it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty
on the public authority in this instance based upon a reasoned consideration of the
detriment to the public interest, should liability be held to exist as against the to-
tal loss to all potential plaintiffs were there held to be no viable cause of action. 120
The English common law delineating the policy/operational dichotomy is
thus confronted with an unexpected hurdle in its evolutionary development as it
seeks to define and delineate the scope of sovereign immunity as it currently
stands in England today. The imposition of an external due process standard will
certainly have a chilling effect of any trial court confronted with a Motion to
Strike a claim based upon a government-plead claim that the conduct in question
is not actionable based upon its public policy nature. Rather, it would certainly
appear more expedient to deny such a request and let discovery proceed regard-
less of the viability of either party's claim.
At least one English legal scholar has thus suggested that the pol-
icy/operational distinction be abandoned in favor of simply addressing the justi-
ciability of the plaintiff's action.' However, this results in what is basically a
semantic change, as evidenced by the fact that the same salient dilemma still
faces courts in the United States, which has arguably already based its exception
on this position, as the same viability issues would exist regardless of what the
distinction is called. Thus in a typical case, the plaintiff would ask the court to
117 English civil procedure uses a motion to strike in the same manner that the United States
uses a motion to dismiss, and the two are very similar with respect to their procedural application and
effect.
118 Barrett v. Enfield LBC, 3 All E.R. 19 (1999).
119 Craig & Fairgrieve, supra note 114, at 631.
120 Barrett, supra note 118, at 199f-j; Craig & Fairgrieve, supra note 114, at 631.
121 CRAIG, supra note 114, at 862-63.
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consider the merits of his claim (based upon the degree of harm sustained) in
light of the adverse effects the viability of same would have on any public inter-
est benefits (social, economic, and political) that are derived from preserving the
government authority's claim of non-suit in response to the authority's motion to
strike. Accordingly, the evolutionary trend of the policy/operational dichotomy
should and will continue as the English appellate courts seek to surmount this
most recent obstacle in their efforts to secure justice through the application of
the common law.
C. Canada
The petition of right, including the requirement of the fiat, remained the
procedure for suing the Crown in Canada until after the enactment of the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, in the United Kingdom. The Federal Parliament acted in
stages, abolishing the fiat requirement in 1951, and it adopted the Crown Liabil-
ity Act in 1952 (now codified as the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C., ch. C-50
(1985)(Can.)). However, it retained the procedural requisite of the petition of
right until 1971.122 It is important to note that, until 1949, the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council in England was "the major interpreter of the Canadian
constitution and the major expounder of explicit views on the nature of Canadian
federalism" until appeals to this body were abolished by the British North Amer-
ica Act, 1949.123 Thus, it was not until after 1949 that Canadian common law
was necessarily a more accurate reflection of the social, political, and economic
values of Canadian society (or at least the empowered element of same), as it was
not until this time that Canada had the final (and only) say in the interpretation of
its laws.
The Crown Liability Act was modeled after the English Crown Proceedings
Act, 1947,124 and it allowed that the federal government (the Crown) would be
liable:
- in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and
capacity, it would be liable
- in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown; or
- in respect of a breach of duty attaching to the ownership, occupation, posses-
sion or control of property. 
21
122 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7-8.
123 GARTH STEVENSON, UNFULFILLED UNION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM & NATIONAL UNITY
43, 259 (rev. ed. 1982).
124 HOGG, supra note 22, at 84-85.
125 Crown Liability Act, supra note 1, § 3; "A special problem with respect the Crown in right
of Canada, in situations where it is liable in tort, is the choice of applicable law. Tort law is gener-
ally provincial, not federal. The best view seems to be that the federal Crown's liability in tort should
be determined in accordance with the law of the province in which the cause of action arose."
HOGG, supra note 22, at 86 n. 33.
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The Act also allowed that, "The Crown is liable for the damage sustained by
any person by reason of a motor vehicle, owned by the Crown, on a highway,
for which the Crown would be liable if were a private person of full age and ca-
pacity," 12 6 Hence, in its partial waiver of the Crown's common law immunity
form suit, the Crown Liability Act also did not specifically reserve the govern-
ment's immunity with respect to discretionary duties and functions. Rather, the
policy/operational distinction developed out of the court's consideration of the
duty of care issue and was implemented by means of case law in the same man-
ner as it did in England.
The foremost case delineating the liability of public authorities is the Su-
preme Court of Canada's opinion in Nielson v. Kamloops (City). 27 In resolving
the issue of the potential liability of a public authority involved in a fact scenario
that is quite similar to the fact scenario considered by the House of Lords in
Ans, the Kamloops majority opinion held that liability might lie against a mu-
nicipality for failing to enforce a stop work order issued to a builder after the
municipality's inspector discovered faulty foundations during the construction of
a property. The stop work order was issued for the express purpose of protect-
ing the plaintiffs predecessor's interest in the real property. The builder failed to
abide by the order and the municipality did not attempt to enforce it.'28
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Ans
in its consideration of whether the municipality owed a duty of care to the plain-
tiff,'29 and, accordingly, the majority held that the decision of the public authority
as concerning whether or not it should enforce its own order was operational in
nature and gave rise to a duty of care to the plaintiff."0 However, the majority
also noted that the municipality would not have breached any duty of care if its
affirmative decision not to enforce the stop work order was based on legitimate
public policy reasons: "If it decided against taking them, say on economic
grounds, then it would be a legitimate policy decision within the operational con-
text and the courts should not interfere with it. ""' The municipality's duty of
care required, "at the very least, a conscious decision not to act on policy
grounds." 3 2 Because the evidence suggested that the issue of enforcement was
simply not addressed by the municipality, Justice Wilson, writing for the major-
ity, concluded that, "In my view, inaction for no reason or inaction for improper
reason cannot be a policy decision taken in the bona fide exercise of discre-
126 Crown Liability Act, supra note 1, § 4.
127 Nielson v. City of Kaloops et al., [1984] 2 S.C. R. 2.
128 Id. at. 6-7.
129 Id. at 117. The two-step test concerning whether a duty of care might be owed, as set forth
in Anns, supra, was adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in its opinion in Kamloops, and it has
subsequently been readopted by the Supreme Court as the "Anns/Kamloops test" in Just v. British
Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228; Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R.
165; and Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 168 D.L.R. 513.
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tion. " '33
The Supreme Court of Canada next addressed the policy/operational distinc-
tion in Just v. British Columbia34 . In Just, Justice Cory, writing for the major-
ity, recognized the "dilemma giving rise to the continuing judicial struggle to dif-
ferentiate between 'policy' and 'operation.""1 35  He reviewed English, United
States, and Australian case law addressing the underlying rationale for the dis-
tinction, and he concluded that:
The decisions in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council and City of Kamloops
v. Nielson indicate that a government agency in reaching a decision pertaining to
inspection must act in a reasonable manner which constitutes a bona fide exer-
cise of discretion. To do so they must specifically consider whether to inspect
and if so, the system of inspection must be a reasonable one in all of the circum-
stances .... Thus a true policy decision may be made at a lower level pro-
vided that the government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision in
light of the surrounding circumstances.' 36
Justice Cory then proceeded to set forth examples of policy considerations
that would fall within the "policy" distinction, and he noted that the "manner and
quality" of the public authority's implementation of an otherwise policy-oriented
program "is clearly part of the operational aspect of a government activity and
falls to be assessed in the standard of care issue."' 37
Accordingly, the common law development of the policy/operational dichot-
omy in Canada can be viewed as generally falling in line with the English and
United States case law interpreting the issue. However, Canada is not bound to
follow the decisions of the ECtHR, as is its English counterpart, and thus it is
unlikely that it will impose the same awkward procedural hurdles into its case
law interpreting and delineating the distinction. Thus, while it will continue to
view English substantive law as persuasive in its determinations, the actual pro-
cedural evolution will be far more akin to the United States' interpretive common
law.
D. Australia
The Australian Commonwealth maintains a formal Constitutional link with
the British Crown, however like Canada the decisions of Australia's courts are
no longer appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England.
Nevertheless, Australian courts look to English case law for persuasive precedent
133 Id.
134 Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
135 Id. at 1239.
136 Id. at 1242-43.
137 Id. at 1244-45. Justice Cory also noted that, "[T]he requisite standard of care to be applied
to the particular operation must be assessed in light of all the surrounding circumstances including,




in interpreting their own common law. Also, Australia was the first of the coun-
tries considered in this article to partially waive its immunity, and it did so in §
64 of the Judiciary Act, 1903. In pertinent part, § 64 provides that "in any suit
to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of the parties shall as
nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on
either side, as in a suit between subject and subject.""'
This statutory waiver of immunity predates the English Crown Proceedings
Act, 1947 by almost half of a century, and this partially explains why the Austra-
lian common law interpretation of the waiver is occasionally divergent from the
English, Canadian, and New Zealand law despite the fact that the Australian
courts rely heavily on the decisions of the House of Lords in this area.
The Australian common law starting point in determining whether liability
might exist against a public authority is found in the decision of High Court of
Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman. 3 9 In Heyman, Justice Mason
observed that:
Generally speaking, a public authority which is under no statutory obligation to
exercise a power comes under no common law duty of care to do so .... But
an authority may by its conduct place itself in such a position that it attracts a
duty of care which calls for exercise of the power. A common illustration is
provided by the cases in which an authority in the exercise of its functions has
created a danger, thereby subjecting itself to a duty of care for the safety of oth-
ers which must be discharged by an exercise of its statutory powers or by giving
a warning .... 140
The policy/operational distinction was first introduced into Australian com-
mon law by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in L. v. Common-
wealth.141 In L v. Commonwealth, the plaintiff was a temporary prisoner in an
"obsolete, over-crowded and grossly inadequate" facility who was placed by
prison authorities in a cell with two other prisoners, both of whom had known
violent propensities.4 2 The plaintiff was assaulted and raped by his cellmates,
and he sued the Commonwealth for damages sustained as the result of the negli-
gence of the prison officials in allowing this assault to take place. 1
4 3
In determining that liability could lie against the government, Justice Ward
accepted the distinction between the polLy and operational levels of government
activity.'" While he determined that the physical inadequacy of the prison struc-
ture (in that it was not large enough to segregate prisoners for their own protec-
138 Australian Judiciary Act Section 64 (1903).
139 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424.
140 Id. at 459-60.
141 L. v. Commonwealth (1976) 10 A.L.R. 269 (N.T.S.C.). This case preceded the House of
Lords' decision in Anns by approximately two years, making Australia the first country outside of the
United States to adopt the distinction.
142 Id. at 278-80.
143 Id. at 270-71.
144 Id. at 276.
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tion) was a deficiency at the planning level and therefore not actionable, he also
determined that the prison authority's operational activities in placing the plaintiff
in a cell with prisoners with a known propensity for violence and in failing to
take adequate remedial measures to protect the plaintiff's welfare once the threat
was known amounted to actionable negligence."'
Like all legal systems implementing the distinction, the courts in Australia
have also recognized the difficulties inherent in its application and have made ef-
forts to delineate the distinction. Justice Mason, in his reasons for decision in
Heyman, observed that:
The distinction between policy and operational factors is not easy to formu-
late, but the dividing line between them will be observed if we recognize that a
public authority is under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or
are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints.
Thus budgetary allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms of allo-
cation of resources cannot be made the subject of a duty of care. But it may be
otherwise when the courts are called upon to apply a standard of care to action or
inaction that is merely the product of administrative direction, expert or profes-
sional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness.'"
Australia has followed English common law precedent in interpreting the
distinction, and the High Court looked to, inter alia, the House of Lords' opinion
in X v Bedfordshire County Council in its opinion Crimmins v Stevedoring Indus-
try Finance Committee"4 7 addressing the issue of when the policy/operational dis-
tinction would preclude consequent consideration of whether a duty of care might
exist.
In Crimmins, the High Court considered the issue of whether a public au-
thority might owe a duty of care to an individual,' 48 and it extensively considered
the decisions of the House of Lords discussed previously in this article addressing
the issue of when liability might be allowed to lie in making its own determina-
tion. In Crimmins, the plaintiff sued a public authority in a common law negli-
gence action. The trial court found for the plaintiff, and the Victorian Court of
Appeal set aside the verdict, holding that the statutory authority did not owe a
common law duty of care to the plaintiff. 4 9 In his reasons for decision-reversing
the Court of Appeal, Justice McHugh of the High Court of Australia (with Chief
Justice Gleeson, author of the lead decision, agreeing)5 ° resolved that a duty of
care did, in fact, exist, and he explained his reasoning by opining:
In my opinion, therefore, in a novel case where a plaintiff alleges that a statutory
authority owed him or her a common law duty of care and breached that duty by
failing to exercise a statutory power, the issue of duty should be determined by
145 Id. at 276, 281.
146 Heyman, supra note 139, at 469.
147 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee, (1999) 167 A.L.R. 1, 22.
148 Id. at 1, 3 and 13.
149 Id.




1. Was it reasonably foreseeable that an act or omission of the defendant,
including a failure to exercise its statutory powers, would result in injury to
the plaintiff or his or her interests? If no, then there is no duty.
2. By reason of the defendant's statutory or assumed obligations or control,
did the defendant have the power to protect a specific class including the
plaintiff (rather than the public at large) from a risk of harm? If no, then
there is no duty.
3. Was the plaintiff or were the plaintiffs interests vulnerable in the sense
that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to adequately safeguard
himself or herself or those interests from harm? If no, then there is no duty.
4. Did the defendant know, or ought the defendant to have known, of the
risk of harm to the specific class including the plaintiff if it did not exercise
its powers? If no, then there is no duty.
5. Would such a duty impose liability with respect to the defendant's exer-
cise of "core policy-making" or "quasi-legislative" functions? If yes, then
there is no duty.
6. Are there any other supervening reasons in policy to deny the existence
of a duty of care (e.g., the imposition of a duty is inconsistent with the
statutory scheme, or the case is concerned with pure economic loss and the
application of principles in that field deny the existence of a duty)? If yes,
then there is no duty.
If the first four questions are answered in the affirmative, and the last two in
the negative, it would ordinarily be correct in principle to impose a duty of care
on the statutory authority. '
Thus, the High Court utilized the legal precedent set forth in the English
House of Lords' decisions to formulate and justify their own test for when liabil-
ity may lay and when policy issues may bar an action's viability. Accordingly,
while Australia's legal system still looks to and is influenced by English common
law precedent in determining the scope of immunity still enjoyed by government
authorities, its courts have developed their own unique interpretation of when the
dichotomy might preclude liability. And while the dichotomy is applied in tan-
dem with the consideration of whether a duty of care might exist, as opposed to
subsequent to the consideration of the issue as it occurs in England and Canada
(and New Zealand, as will be shown), the initial pleading by a government au-
thority of the preclusion of liability in an action based upon policy considerations
151 Id. at 24-25.
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would still bar an action at its outset. Hence, the dichotomy has developed in
Australia in a manner that is distinct from, but also similar to, its evolution in the
other States considered in this article.
E. New Zealand
New Zealand's Parliament adopted the Statute of Westminster in 1947, and
thus New Zealand's relationship with England is predicated upon its "common
history and culture.""52 Regardless, New Zealand still retains a formal link with
the laws of England, and, unlike Canada and Australia, decisions of New Zea-
land courts are still appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
(which applies New Zealand law in its review). 53 Further, English case law
from the House of Lords is controlling precedent in interpreting New Zealand
cases in New Zealand courts." 4 It is important to note, however, that the legal
decisions of New Zealand's courts are not appealable to the House of Lords, and
this discrepancy is explained when one notes that the reason "that the hierarchy
of precedents . . . has one tier more than the hierarchy of courts" is that "the
uniformity of the common law of the United Kingdom and the parts of the Com-
monwealth that still permit appeal to the Privy Council can be maintained only by
recognition of the ultimate authority of a single court ... 5
The laws of other countries in the Commonwealth (most importantly Austra-
lia's) are viewed as persuasive precedent in New Zealand law,' 6 but New Zea-
land's Crown Proceedings Act, 1950, was modeled after the English Crown Pro-
ceedings Act, 1947, and bears very little resemblance to Australia's statutory
waiver of liability.'57 The Crown Proceedings Act, 1950, is not a general waiver
of immunity, and, like the Federal Tort Claims Act, instead, "the general princi-
pal of immunity is left but very wide exceptions are carved out of it. "'
The policy/operational dichotomy developed in New Zealand as it did in
England and Canada as its courts sought to delineate the scope of the govern-
ment's immunity, and the foremost New Zealand case addressing the distinction
is ironically the Privy Council's opinion in Rowling v. Takaro Properties [1988]
App. Cas. 473 (P.C. 1987)(appeal taken from N.Z.). The New Zealand courts
are bound by precedent to accept the House of Lord's decision in Anns v. Merton
London Borough, as controlling precedent in the interpretation of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy as it has been developed in New Zealand's common
law, but the distinction was further explored in Rowling. In Rowling, Lord Keith
addressed the policy/operational dichotomy in the contemporary English common
152 JAMES HUFFMAN, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY AND DISASTER MITIGATION 260 (1986).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 260.
155 Id.; K.J. SCOTT, THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION 157 (1962).
156 HUFFMAN, supra note 152, at 260.
157 Id. at 303.
158 Id. (quoting from the Public ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, DAMAGES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 (1980)).
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law tradition by enquiring as to whether (and when) a duty of care on the part of
a government minister to a private party may arise.' 59 The plaintiff's Complaint
was initially struck for failing to state a claim based upon the trial court's deter-
mination that no duty of care existed based on the minister's purported ultra vires
exercise of his statutory powers.60 After many levels of appeals and reverses in
the New Zealand legal system, the trial court determined that a duty of care to
the plaintiff existed and it eventually entered a judgment on the merits for the
plaintiff. 161
In the opinion deriving from the eventual appeal by the government minister
to the Privy Council on, inter alia, the discretionary authority issue, Lord Keith
quoted extensively from that part of the opinion of the New Zealand appellate
court recounting the problems they encountered in applying the dichotomy, and
noted that "Their Lordships feel considerable sympathy with . . .[the New Zea-
land court's] difficulty in solving the problem by simple reference to this distinc-
tion." 162
Lord Keith noted that the policy/operational distinction does not provide a
touchstone of liability, but rather is expressive of the need to exclude altogether
those cases in which the decision under attack is of such a kind that a question
whether it has been made negligently is unsuitable for judicial resolution, of
which notable examples are discretionary decisions on the allocation of scarce
resources or the distribution of risks. If this is right, classification of the relevant
decision as a policy or planning decision in this sense may exclude liability; but a
conclusion that it does not fall within this category does not, in their Lordships'
opinion, mean that a duty of care will necessarily exist. 1
63
Correspondingly, the Privy Council determined that even if the minister
misinterpreted his statutory power and acted outside the scope of his discretion as
the result of his error, the activities performed that were predicated upon his mis-
taken beliefs would not be characterized as negligent if the erroneous interpreta-
tion was clearly "a tenable one."1
The common law development of the policy/operational dichotomy in New
Zealand is generally governed by English case law interpretation of the issue, and
the distinction's development in New Zealand will most likely mirror its devel-
opment in England. Like Canada, however, New Zealand is not bound to con-
sider the decisions of the ECtHR, and thus it is unlikely that it will impose the
same procedural obstacles into its case law interpreting and delineating the dis-
tinction.
159 Rowling v. Takaro Properties [19881 1 A.C. 473, 500 (U.K.).
160 Id. at 497.
161 Id. at 498-99.
162 Id. at 501.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 507.
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IV. A UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM WOULD ALLEVIATE
THE DILEMMAS ENCOUNTERED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
POLICY/OPERATIONAL DISTINCTION
The common law judicial systems in each of the States under analysis are
still remarkably similar in procedural structures regardless of the form of gov-
ernment employed by these States. Further, their respective judiciaries continue
to refer to each other's common law developments as persuasive precedent in re-
solving their own related legal issues. The policy/operational dichotomy that
originated in the United States and emigrated back to England is also utilized in
roughly the same manner in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And despite
the attention received by the dichotomy in the courts of each of the forgoing, the
most enigmatic question, i.e., the demarcation of where policy or discretionary
considerations (and immunity) end and where operational activities (and tort li-
ability) begin, continues to vex the courts attempting to apply the distinction.
Further, England's submission to the jurisdictional authority of the ECtHR has
presented a new obstacle in the evolutionary development of the dichotomy, and,
as noted supr, some legal authorities are suggesting that it is now time to aban-
don the distinction as untenable. This, however, is not necessarily the case.
Rather, this development is a natural and logical subsequent evolutionary step in
the development of this complex legal distinction.
It is proposed in this article that the policy/operational dichotomy should
continue to remain a test of the viability of an action in negligence against a
State. However, it should be implemented in a bifurcated two-step form. The
first step of the test would be to determine whether, as a matter of law at the time
of the filing of a Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike based upon the govern-
mental authority's defense that immunity has not been waived in this area, the
plaintiffs' Complaint alleges on its face that the State is liable to the plaintiffs for
breaching a duty of care as predicated upon policy issues that are clearly not vi-
able (such as the discretionary allocation of scarce resources or the allocation of
risks). In the event that a claim was determined to be non-viable for such rea-
sons, the action would be precluded as a matter of law and dismissed at that time.
However, in the event that it is not readily apparent that the Complaint is
not actionable for policy reasons at the outset of litigation, the next step, or sec-
ond stage, would require that the court weigh the discretionary reasonableness of
the conduct exercised by the governmental body in light of both the injury sus-
tained by the claimant and the public policy issues influencing the government
body's conduct. This question would be of a quasi-legal/quasi-factual nature, as
it would require the court to consider the injuries sustained by the claimant in
light of public policy. It should be considered at the end of a shortened discov-
ery process that would be specifically tailored to resolve the viability issue. In
the event that the court determined that, as a matter of law, the government au-
thority proffered sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate that it had acted
reasonably in light of the applicable government policies and that it had not
caused the claimant to sustain injuries that were unreasonable in light of the goals
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sought to be achieved by the government body, then the suit would be barred as
non-viable." 6 If any questions of fact preclude the court's denial of the viability
of the claim as a matter of law after the second stage of the test is applied, the
claim should be allowed to go to trial for a determination of the issue on the mer-
its of the case.
This evolutionary development of the policy/operational dichotomy would
be consistent with the state of the law in the United States, England, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, and it would allow the English legal system to rec-
oncile its common law with the requirements set for the ECtHR in its opinion in
Osman. Further, the bifurcated nature of the test is consistent with and would
greater satisfy the goals of legal reform and fairness by allowing courts, in the
application of the second stage of the test, to take into consideration the injuries
averred by plaintiffs and would afford plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge the
reasonableness of the governmental authority's immunity claim in light of the
real burden borne by individuals within society. The second stage of the test
would also aid the courts in resolving difficult cases, as it is not merely an appli-
cation of the orthodox distinction but rather it is an interpretary, evolutionary
outgrowth of the doctrine that is designed to further promote its fair implementa-
tion. It expands upon the theory of the dichotomy by allowing the courts to con-
sider evidence on the issue of viability while still allowing government authorities
to reasonably contain and limit legal actions by providing for the efficient dis-
posal of claims that are legitimately barred by public policy considerations. Ac-
cordingly, it would allow the courts to apply the policy/operational dichotomy in
a manner that is consistent with the original intentions of its creators but yet still
is mindful of the dynamic social, political, and economic factors that are continu-
ously redefining societal goals and values.
Authority for the viability of this proposal can be found in the United States
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107
S. Ct. 3034 (1987). Anderson dealt with the reasonableness of a trial court's
grant of a "motion to dismiss or for summary judgment" based on qualified im-
munity grounds that was filed in response to the plaintiffs' (the Creightons')
complaint and before any discovery occurred." 6  The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that factual disputes concerning the vi-
165 While it is true that a party who sues the United States has the burden of pointing to a Con-
gressional act that provides the government's consent to the suit (See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S.
643, 648 (1962)), the burden of proving the non-viability of an action plead under the Federal Tort
Claims Act should be borne by the defendant governmental authority. This is because the govern-
mental authority, as the movant and the profferer of an affirmative defense, should bear the onus of
demonstrating the viability of its own motion. This is also because the government authority, in pre-
cluding the viability of the plaintiffs' claims with its sovereign immunity defense, will be infringing
upon the plaintiffs' human and fundamental right to due process. Thus, the government authority
should be saddled with the burden of proving that its activities were reasonably related to the imple-
mentation of the public policy submitted as the basis for immunity and that it had not caused the
claimant, in the application of this policy, to sustain injuries that were unreasonable in light of the
goals sought to be achieved in the implementation of the policies.
166 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987).
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ability of the governmental agent's (Anderson's) claim of qualified immunity re-
mained unresolved.'67 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, noted that quali-
fied immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a liti-
gation.16' Nevertheless, the case was remanded back to the trial court so that
limited discovery on the immunity issue could take place. 169 In his opinion, Jus-
tice Scalia observed that "one of the purposes... of qualified immunity is to pro-
tect officials from the 'broad ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive
of effective government,"' and thus he directed that:
[O]n remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons al-
lege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discov-
ery. If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims are different from those
the Creighton's allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson's motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course,
any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson's
qualified immunity. 70
While this note is not directly dispositive of procedural handling of the di-
chotomy, Justice Scalia's directions on remand in Anderson provide an instruc-
tive guide as to how to begin to resolve the policy/operational distinction in the
future. Further, the fact that the Anderson Court has already directly supported
this procedural mechanism suggests that United States courts would welcome this
proposal. Finally, because of the jurisprudential borrowing that has character-
ized the respective evolutions of the policy/operational dichotomy in all of the
countries addressed in this article, it is foreseeable that all of the legal systems
considered could adopt this bifurcated test in an effort to manage the opacity that
continues to make the dichotomy a difficult distinction to apply.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States, England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have
sought to remedy the inherent inequities encountered in the sovereign immunity
provisions remaining in their respective common laws by legislating a partial
waiver of their immunity from suits filed by private individuals. At this time,
public policy considerations still require that the immunity from suit enjoyed by
public authorities not be fully and entirely waived. In an effort to impose order
upon a chaotic situation, the policy/operational dichotomy has emerged in all of
the forgoing countries as their courts have attempted to delineate the scope of
their respective society's waiver of immunity. However, this dichotomy is not,
167 Id.
168 Id. at 646, n. 6.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 646, n. 6.
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at present, the panacea that the legal systems might have hoped it would be.
Rather, it must continue to be developed and refined, as are all other doctrines in
the common law, in order that the dichotomy might be more useful to the courts
in the elusive task of attempting to mete out the justice demanded by the parties
submitting to the jurisdiction of their legal systems.
However, the policy/operational dichotomy is more than a remedial distinc-
tion: its evolutionary development is an example of the ever-continuing transfor-
mation of the common law. The dichotomy is always seeking, but never quite
achieving, a state of perfection through which justice can reliably be achieved.
Accordingly, although the courts continue to revise the common law in order to
reflect society's ever-changing (and rarely concurring) social, political, and eco-
nomic values, the difficulty inherent in applying the dichotomy is not unlike the
difficulty inherent in achieving justice through the application of the common law
to a dynamic society. The proposed bifurcated application of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy would aid in this effort, and, because it is a simple
procedural mechanism that would be universally applicable in the common law
legal systems found in all of the forgoing States germinating from England's
common law legacy, its facilitation of the substantive development of the com-
mon law would benefit the forgoing legal systems in achieving their commonly
held goal of securing justice for their respective societies.
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